About Behaviorism

Skinner argues that methodological behaviorism, associated with John B. Watson, sought to close off mentalistic explanations by denying the scientific legitimacy of self-observation. Radical behaviorism, by contrast, does not deny the possibility of self-observation or self-knowledge. Skinner writes that radical behaviorism "restores introspection" while treating what is introspectively observed not as mental causes but as private behavior subject to the same functional analysis as public conduct . This distinction matters because it deflects the most common objection—that behaviorists deny feelings and sensations—by clarifying that radical behaviorism acknowledges private events; it simply refuses to treat them as explanatory entities that stand outside the causal chain of environmental variables.

The book opens by listing twenty contentions that Skinner identifies as misunderstandings of behaviorism. They include charges that behaviorism ignores consciousness, denies innate endowment, neglects cognitive processes, cannot explain creativity, is scientistic rather than scientific, and is indifferent to human warmth and the enjoyment of art. Skinner addresses them across fourteen chapters organized by topic: the causes of behavior, the world within the skin, innate behavior, operant behavior, perceiving, verbal behavior, thinking, causes and reasons, knowing, motivation and emotion, the self and others, the question of control, and a final summing up. The format is defensive and systematic, designed to answer critics point by point rather than to present new experimental findings.

Skinner argues that contingencies of reinforcement resemble contingencies of survival in the production of novelty. In both natural selection and operant conditioning, the appearance of mutations is crucial. He notes that geneticists can now arrange conditions under which mutations are particularly likely to occur, and that new forms of behavior can similarly be selected by prevailing contingencies. The creative artist or thinker, he adds, has other ways of introducing novelties beyond random variation . This response is an extension of the selectionist framework Skinner developed in Contingencies of Reinforcement, applying the variation-and-selection model to the generation of novel behavior rather than treating creativity as a special faculty outside behavioral analysis.

The New York Times review by Christopher Lehmann-Haupt praised the book as an unusually compact summary and a veritable artwork of organization, predicting that readers would never again be able to think of behaviorism as a simplistic philosophy that reduces human beings to black boxes . However, the same review identified unresolved quandaries: Skinner makes countless references to advances in experiments with human beings but fails to provide a single illustration, and he does not satisfactorily rebut the charge that behaviorism is scientistic rather than scientific. A harsher assessment appeared in Partisan Review, which called the book awful and replete with utterly vacuous theories, noting that Skinner almost never names his critics or quotes them directly, leading to suspicion that many are straw men .

Science and Human Behavior (1953) was Skinner's first comprehensive synthesis, applying operant principles to education, psychotherapy, government, and culture. About Behaviorism (1974) is narrower and more defensive: it is a philosophical clarification rather than a systematic application. It was written in the aftermath of the controversy surrounding Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971), which had drawn widespread criticism and accusations of authoritarianism. As one assessment notes, Skinner had gone on the defensive, offering answers and explanations for everyone . The book remains a key reference for understanding radical behaviorism's philosophical commitments, though its influence has been greater within behavior analysis than in mainstream psychology, where Skinner's eminence had already begun to decline by the time of its publication .

Skinner devotes two chapters to the world within the skin, arguing that private events—thoughts, feelings, sensations—are not inaccessible to science but are simply behavior that occurs at a smaller scale and is observable only to the individual. He rejects the Watsonian ban on introspection and instead proposes that private events can be analyzed functionally, as responses under the control of environmental variables. The brain imaging evidence later cited by behavior analysts supports this continuity: when people talk to themselves, the same language and motor areas activate as when they speak aloud . Skinner's position is thus more nuanced than the caricature of behaviorism as denying inner life; he acknowledges private events while denying them causal status independent of environmental contingencies.