Moral Stages: A Current Formulation and a Response to Critics

The book serves as Kohlberg's mature, consolidated formulation of moral stage theory and a direct rebuttal to two decades of criticism. Unlike his earlier essays, which introduced the six-stage sequence and the cognitive-developmental approach, this monograph explicitly addresses objections from Gilligan, Gibbs, and others. It presents theoretical revisions—including the differentiation of 'hard' and 'soft' stages and clarification of the form-content distinction—alongside synopses of specific criticisms and Kohlberg's detailed replies. It is both a summing-up and a defense, written with Charles Levine and Alexandra Hewer.

Kohlberg argues that Gilligan's critique misconstrues the theory's object. He insists that the stages describe the structure of justice reasoning—how a person reasons about fairness, rights, and obligations—not the content of specific moral values. Because women and men do not differ in their capacity for justice reasoning, he contends there is no sexual bias in any strong sense. He acknowledges that women have historically scored lower on his measures but attributes this to differences in educational and occupational opportunities, not to a deficiency in moral reasoning capacity.

Kohlberg introduced several revisions. He distinguished 'hard' structural stages, which are genuinely invariant and hierarchical, from 'soft' stages that represent less tightly organized developmental trends. He clarified the form-content distinction, arguing that stages describe formal properties of reasoning rather than the specific moral beliefs a person holds. He also revised the A and B substages, clarified the ambiguous status of Stage 6, and listed nine metaethical assumptions underlying the research program. These changes were intended to make the theory more defensible against charges of rigidity and overreach.

The form-content distinction separates the structure of moral reasoning (how a person organizes and justifies moral judgments) from the content of those judgments (the specific values or conclusions reached). Kohlberg argues that his stages describe form, not content—the logic of justice reasoning, not whether a person favors one political or ethical doctrine over another. This distinction allows him to claim universality: all people develop through the same sequence of formal structures, even if the content of their moral beliefs varies across cultures. Critics question whether form and content can be so cleanly separated.

The debate remains unresolved. Research using Kohlberg's own measure did find average sex differences favoring males, but these largely disappeared when education and occupation were controlled. Gilligan's care orientation has been integrated into developmental psychology as a distinct moral domain, not merely a female variant of justice reasoning. Some scholars argue that Kohlberg's defense conceded too little: the theory's emphasis on justice may still reflect a culturally specific moral framework, even if it is not sexist in the narrow sense. The 2024 Kohlberg Memorial Lecture argued that moral maturity involves humane regard—respect for agency combined with concern for suffering—which exceeds Kantian justice alone.

Levine and Hewer are credited co-authors of the monograph, which appeared as Volume 10 in the Contributions to Human Development series. Portions were later incorporated into Kohlberg's 1984 collection The Psychology of Moral Development, which reprinted 'The Current Formulation of the Theory' and 'Synopses and Detailed Replies to Critics' as Part 2. The collaboration reflects Kohlberg's reliance on colleagues to systematize and defend his evolving theory, particularly as criticism mounted in the late 1970s and early 1980s.