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Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration
Lijphart's Democracy in Plural Societies argues that stable democracy is possible in deeply divided societies through consociationalism, a power-sharing model that rejects the majoritarian principle of winner-take-all. Its central mechanism is a four-part framework: grand coalition (elite power-sharing across segments), mutual veto (concurrent majority protection for minorities), proportionality (proportional allocation of offices and resources), and segmental autonomy (self-rule for groups) [citation:5]. Written after observing the failure of Westminster-style democracy in postcolonial Africa and the success of small European divided societies like Switzerland and the Netherlands, the book shifts from describing consociational practices to prescribing them as the necessary institutional foundation for democratic stability in plural societies [citation:10][citation:11].
What are the four defining elements of consociational democracy, and why does Lijphart argue they are necessary?
Lijphart identifies four characteristics: a grand coalition of political leaders from all significant segments, a mutual veto granting each group the ability to block decisions affecting it, proportional representation in allocation of offices and resources, and segmental autonomy allowing each group to govern itself in areas of exclusive concern [citation:5]. He argues that these elements are necessary because majoritarian democracy, which works in homogeneous societies with cross-cutting cleavages, fails in plural societies where cleavages are segmental and reinforcing. In the latter, a permanent majority can exclude a permanent minority, destroying incentives for peaceful compromise and making democracy itself unstable [citation:2].
How has consociational theory been criticized since the book's publication?
Critics have challenged the theory on several fronts. One major criticism is that consociationalism assumes ethnic divisions are fixed and primordial, thereby entrenching rather than resolving the sectarianism that produced conflict [citation:15]. Lijphart's measurement of 'plural society' has been called vague and inconsistent; Jürg Steiner noted he mixes external isolation with internal cohesion without clear operational criteria [citation:1]. Others criticize the theory for concentrating power in the hands of elites, producing weak opposition and a lack of democratic accountability. Empirical cases like India have been cited as deviant examples that consociationalism cannot adequately explain [citation:7].
How does this book relate to Lijphart's later Patterns of Democracy?
Patterns of Democracy (1999) is the empirical culmination of the research program that Democracy in Plural Societies launched. Where the 1977 book focuses specifically on deeply divided societies and prescribes consociationalism as the solution, Patterns of Democracy broadens the argument by mapping all established democracies onto a two-dimensional typology of majoritarian vs. consensus democracy [citation:12]. Lijphart himself acknowledges that the arguments in Democracy in Plural Societies are somewhat dated and points readers to Patterns for the updated version [citation:5]. The later book drops the focus on 'plural societies' as a distinct category, embedding consociational insights into a more general theory of democratic performance.
What is the most common misconception about Lijphart's consociational model?
A common misconception treats consociational democracy as a purely descriptive typology of a few small European countries. In fact, Lijphart's project is explicitly prescriptive and normative, especially after the 1970s. He argues that consociational arrangements are not only feasible but are the only realistic settlement capable of attracting agreement among all factions in post-conflict divided societies [citation:2]. The model has been applied in constitutional design for South Africa, Northern Ireland, and other divided societies [citation:11]. The four elements are presented as 'recipes' or 'devices' that can be employed piecemeal rather than as an all-or-nothing package [citation:14].
How did Lijphart's own view of the term 'consociational' evolve, and what does this reveal about the book's impact?
Lijphart initially used 'consociational democracy' as an academic term, but later admitted it was too polysyllabic and esoteric for political actors [citation:10]. He adopted 'power-sharing' as an intuitive synonym to facilitate communication beyond academia. This shift reflects the book's trajectory from a descriptive academic concept to a prescriptive tool for constitutional engineering. By the 1980s, Lijphart was fully convinced of the prescriptive power of consociationalism, and the term 'power-sharing' became the standard vocabulary in international conflict resolution and constitution-making [citation:10].
What specific historical and empirical sources shaped the argument of Democracy in Plural Societies?
Lijphart drew on several sources. His earlier study of the Netherlands, The Politics of Accommodation (1968), established the puzzle of how a deeply divided society achieved stable democracy [citation:19]. Arthur Lewis's 1965 analysis of thirteen postcolonial African states provided the first modern argument that British-style majoritarian democracy was unsuitable for plural societies [citation:10]. Gerhard Lehmbruch's work on Switzerland and Austria (1967) offered the concept of 'concordance democracy' [citation:10]. Lijphart synthesized these into a general theory, examining political systems across six continents to demonstrate that consociational democracy can be successful in severely divided societies [citation:9].
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