Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes

The book argues that constitutional structures are systems of rewards and deprivations whose working is a function of incentives, and that they perform as intended only under identifiable conditions [citation:6]. Where Parties and Party Systems analyzed how party systems function, this work asks how institutions can be designed or reformed to improve governability [citation:2]. Sartori treats the institutional factor as an independent variable, accepting that causal relations can be determined once a specific slice of reality is chosen for analysis [citation:2]. The method is empirical-analytical but culminates in normative recommendations about which constitutional forms best serve democratic performance.

Alternating presidentialism (alternating or intermittent presidentialism) is Sartori's proposed hybrid: a parliamentary system that, in cases of governability problems, would be replaced by a presidential one [citation:2][citation:11]. It meets the need for strong parliamentary control and efficient government, with safeguards against both parliamentary obstructionism and government by decree [citation:3]. Sartori presents it as a solution to political paralysis in Latin America, post-communist Europe, and countries with dysfunctional parliamentary systems such as Italy and Israel [citation:14]. The proposal is normative and engineering-oriented: it treats constitutions as machines that must function and produce results [citation:8].

Sartori attacks the conventional wisdom that the influence of electoral systems cannot be predicted, and he also disputes the view that proportional representation is always best and will deliver 'consensus democracy' [citation:3][citation:14]. He argues that double-ballot formulas deserve more consideration for their ability to facilitate governability in adverse circumstances [citation:15]. His condition analysis specifies when an electoral system will produce a two-party or multi-party system, rather than treating effects as mechanical [citation:2][citation:11]. This reformulates Duverger's laws into conditional statements with specified scope.

The book is divided into three parts. The first, 'Electoral Systems,' analyzes majority and proportional formulas and the conditions under which votes are translated into representation [citation:11]. The second, 'Presidentialism and Parliamentarism,' compares presidential and semi-presidential systems and the variety of formulas categorized as parliamentary, examining the conditions that allow a political form to perform as intended [citation:3][citation:14]. The third, 'Issues and Proposals,' presents Sartori's own concept of alternating presidentialism [citation:11][citation:17]. The structure moves from empirical analysis to normative design.

The central criticism concerns Sartori's conception of causality and reform. He accepts that causal relations can be determined unequivocally once a slice of reality is chosen, and that institutions can be reformed freely by technocratic experts designing rational solutions based on successful models [citation:2]. Critics argue this underestimates the constraints of context: Sartori himself later addressed the limits of constitutional engineering, acknowledging that the limits of institutional reform are given by the conditions each concrete case imposes [citation:2]. The book's normative engineering orientation has been criticized for treating political institutions as machines that can be optimized without sufficient attention to cultural and social embeddedness.

Sartori's assessment of presidential systems is more nuanced than the strong anti-presidential position associated with Juan Linz. He acknowledges that presidentialism's separation of powers creates a danger of institutional blockage when the president lacks a legislative majority, but he does not conclude that presidentialism is inherently inferior. His semi-presidentialism proposal emerges as the best among existing systems because it is capable of performing better, that is, of not becoming deadlocked with divergent majorities [citation:2]. His alternating presidentialism then represents a further attempt to overcome the remaining deficit by combining parliamentary control with presidential efficiency [citation:3][citation:14].