Crises of Democracy

Przeworski argues that democracies do not contain institutional mechanisms safeguarding them from subversion by duly elected governments observing constitutional norms. He rejects the comforting assumption that wealth or repeated peaceful alternations of power make democracies immune to collapse. The book's core analytical move is distinguishing between sudden coups and gradual 'subversion by stealth'—a process in which elected incumbents use formally legal measures to make elections non-competitive or inconsequential for those in power [citation:2][citation:11].

Przeworski develops the concept of 'subversion by stealth,' the process by which democratic erosion occurs gradually through formally legal and constitutional measures that imperceptibly change the nature of the regime over time. Unlike sudden coups, this form of backsliding can unfold even in comparatively wealthy, established democracies like the United States. He argues that opposition forces can only mobilize successfully against such stealth subversion if they correctly foresee the ultimate authoritarian consequences of early antidemocratic moves from the outset—a condition unlikely to be met given political uncertainty and short citizen attention spans [citation:2][citation:11].

Democracy and Development (2000) was a statistical study of 135 countries testing whether economic development causes democracy, concluding that income stabilizes democracies without causing them to emerge. Crises of Democracy (2019) shifts focus to the quality and vulnerability of established democracies, asking whether contemporary conditions mirror those that preceded past collapses. The earlier book's finding that 'no democracy above Argentina's 1975 per capita GDP has ever collapsed' still stands with one exception—Thailand's 2006 coup—but Przeworski now emphasizes that gradual erosion can occur without formal collapse, a possibility the earlier statistical framework could not capture [citation:2][citation:7].

Przeworski examines four cases: two collapses (Weimar Germany 1928–33 and Chile 1970–73) and two crises that democracy survived (France 1954–62 and 1968, and the United States 1964–76). His conclusion from these 'stories' is that the survival of democracy in France may have been a historical accident. The cases demonstrate that while certain conditions—economic crisis, polarization, weak institutions—increase the risk of breakdown, outcomes ultimately depend on the actions of political actors, not deterministic structural forces [citation:7][citation:8].

Przeworski adopts a minimalist, electoralist definition: democracy is 'a political arrangement in which people select governments through elections and have a reasonable possibility of removing incumbent governments they do not like' [citation:11]. Critics argue this definition is too narrow, questioning whether regimes that systematically exclude women, racial minorities, or the colonized—as the United States did before 1965—should count as democracies even by minimalist standards. Przeworski treats violations of liberal rights and the rule of law as potential threats to electoral competition rather than as definitional features of democracy [citation:1][citation:11].

Przeworski identifies economic inequality and income stagnation as facilitating factors for democratic decline. He argues that the post-World War II compromise—unions, safety nets, and moderate taxation enabling productivity and wages to rise together—fell apart when Reagan and Thatcher attacked unions, leading to wage stagnation and inequality. This, combined with the politics of resentment attacking social programs seen as benefiting minorities and immigrants, produced polarization that disabled consensus and started cycles of governmental failure. However, he emphasizes that economic factors are enabling conditions, not deterministic causes [citation:2][citation:16].