Nationalism and National Unification in Germany

Breuilly argues that German nationalism was as much an effect of nation-state formation as its cause . Unification in 1871 was not the inevitable outcome of a resurgent national spirit but one possible outcome among several, resulting from rapid shifts in the relative power of European states and underlying changes that made nationality a more vital force in politics . A Prussian-led unification was highly unlikely until the 1860s, and the particular way it happened remained a matter of chance to the very end . The national idea, in this account, was shaped by political events rather than driving them.

The volume applies and extends the political theory of nationalism Breuilly developed in Nationalism and the State. In that earlier work, Breuilly argued that nationalism should be understood as a form of politics that arises in opposition to the modern state, not as an expression of pre-existing cultural identity . The 1992 volume brings this framework to bear specifically on the German case, examining how the national idea functioned in political contestation from the Holy Roman Empire through reunification. The essays demonstrate Breuilly's insistence that nationalism is a means of creating identity rather than a reflection of it.

The volume spans from the later Holy Roman Empire through the Napoleonic period, 1848, the unification era, the Second Empire, the Weimar Republic, Nazi Germany, post-war division, and reunification. Breuilly's concluding chapter addresses nationalism and German reunification, extending the analysis to 1990. Contributors include James J. Sheehan on state and nationality in the Napoleonic period, Dieter Langewiesche on Germany and the national question in 1848, William Carr on the unification of Germany, Mary Fulbrook on nation, state and political culture in divided Germany, and others . The essays collectively examine how the 'national idea' functioned across different political regimes and conjunctures.

The volume was reviewed in scholarly journals and recognised as a significant contribution to German nationalism studies. A review in Historische Zeitschrift praised Breuilly's threefold aim—presenting recent interpretations of nationalism, advocating a political approach, and situating German nationalism in its European context—but criticised several of his empirical claims. The reviewer disputed Breuilly's assertion that nationalism had 'no practical significance' in Germany before 1848 and his claim that there was no evidence that national unification under Prussian leadership was genuinely desired . The volume nonetheless became established as a central work on the subject.

A frequent misreading treats Breuilly as arguing that German nationalism was simply a cynical tool manipulated by Bismarck and Prussian elites with no genuine popular appeal. His position is more nuanced. Breuilly argues that nationalist appeals were used by political actors to mobilise support, but this does not mean the resulting national identities were false or insincere. Nationalism is a means of creating identity, and the identities it creates are real and consequential. The political theory is about the mechanisms through which nationalism operates, not about debunking national attachments as illusions. Breuilly's target is the assumption that nationalism simply expresses pre-existing cultural identity.

The traditional narrative presents German unification as the preordained offspring of Prussian power and resurgent nationalism, achieved through Bismarck's diplomatic genius and three wars. Breuilly contests this account in two ways. First, he extends the analysis back to 1800, beyond the crucial ten years up to 1871 that dominate most accounts, to show how social, economic, and cultural developments shaped the context for unification. Second, he argues that Prussian-led unification was highly unlikely until the 1860s and that dimly understood, rapidly changing circumstances—not a master plan—then favoured Prussia . The particular way unification happened remained contingent to the very end.