William H. Riker

Riker argued that federations form through a political bargain between two sets of rational politicians—national and regional leaders—who agree to divide power because they face a common external military threat or see opportunities for territorial expansion. The bargain is not driven by cultural affinity or ideological commitment but by calculations of political survival and advantage. Politicians give up some autonomy because the alternative—conquest by an external enemy or missing expansion opportunities—threatens their hold on power more severely. This rational-choice account challenged earlier explanations that emphasized shared identity or institutional design .

Riker's 1964 book Federalism concluded with this provocative claim because he argued American federalism was designed to protect and perpetuate racial hierarchy. State governments, particularly in the South, used federalism's autonomy to maintain slavery and later segregation. The structural protections for state sovereignty that federalism provides made it easier for local majorities to oppress minorities without federal interference. Riker softened this view later in life after civil rights reforms, writing in 1987 that federalism had become 'a desirable, though still minor, restraint on the leviathan' .

Riker explicitly rejected explanations that treat federalism as an expression of shared national identity or as a product of constitutional wisdom. For Riker, federal institutions are the outcome of strategic bargaining among self-interested political actors. Cultural, linguistic, or ethnic ties may facilitate federal bargains, but they are not the cause. This methodological individualism distinguished him sharply from scholars like Daniel Elazar, who grounded federalism in covenantal traditions and moral commitments. Riker's framework treated political institutions as tools politicians use to achieve their goals, not as embodiments of collective values .

In a 1969 essay titled 'Six Books in Search of a Subject,' Riker made a surprising claim: federalism has very little impact on how people are governed. Despite its institutional complexity, federal systems produce policy outcomes similar to unitary states. The important variable, Riker argued, is not the federal structure itself but the party system. Centralized, disciplined parties control intergovernmental conflict; decentralized parties allow local interests to disrupt national policymaking. This conclusion puzzled many federalism scholars and remains contested, but it reflected Riker's commitment to testing whether institutions actually matter or are merely epiphenomenal .

Heresthetics is Riker's term for the strategic manipulation of political settings—changing the order of votes, adding new alternatives, or restructuring the decision environment—to achieve outcomes without changing anyone's preferences. Unlike rhetoric, which persuades people to change what they want, heresthetics changes the context in which preferences are aggregated. Riker saw heresthetic maneuvering in the constitutional ratification campaign and in legislative politics. The concept connected to his federalism work because federal bargains often involve heresthetic moves: politicians structure the terms of union to make agreement possible among actors with divergent interests .

Riker transformed the University of Rochester's political science department into the premier center for positive political theory, training a generation of scholars who carried his methods across the discipline. He served as department chair from 1962 to 1977 and founded what became known as the 'Rochester School.' The American Political Science Association awards an annual book prize in his name, and the University of Rochester awards the William H. Riker Prize for undergraduate teaching. His students and collaborators—including Kenneth Shepsle, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and Peter Ordeshook—became influential figures in rational choice political science .