Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures

The central argument is that fictional discourse is a form of pretense, and that names of fictional characters do not genuinely refer. Kripke rejects the Meinongian view that there are non-existent objects that fictional names denote, as well as the Fregean-Russellian strategy of treating fictional names as disguised descriptions. On his account, when we say 'Hamlet was a prince of Denmark,' we are pretending to refer to someone, not actually referring to a non-existent entity. The statement 'Hamlet does not exist' is true, but its truth does not require an object called Hamlet that lacks existence; it expresses the fact that the pretense of Hamlet has no real-world counterpart.

This is one of the lectures' most striking methodological claims. Kripke argues that because fictional discourse operates through pretense rather than genuine reference, it cannot serve as evidence for or against a semantic theory of how names refer in ordinary discourse. A theory that handles fiction well may still fail for actual names, and a theory that handles actual names well need not accommodate fiction. This goes against a common assumption in philosophy of language that fictional names are a crucial test case for any theory of reference. Kripke's point is that the pretense involved in fiction introduces a distinctive dimension that is irrelevant to the semantics of genuine reference.

Reference and Existence can be read as a sequel to Naming and Necessity, addressing issues that the earlier work left open—particularly the semantics of proper names as they occur in fiction and myth, and the problem of negative existential statements . The lectures were delivered in 1973, three years after the Princeton lectures that became Naming and Necessity, and they extend the framework of rigid designation into domains the earlier work did not systematically treat. Kripke himself described the Locke Lectures as an attempt to 'tie up some loose ends' from the earlier work, especially 'the whole topic of how naming relates to existence' .

The lectures were delivered in 1973 but remained unpublished for forty years, available only as a transcript in the Oxford University library that circulated informally among philosophers . Despite their unpublished status, they exercised considerable influence on debates about fiction, empty names, and negative existentials. A reviewer noted that getting a copy of these lectures was 'a holy grail for philosophers working on fiction' . The eventual publication by Oxford University Press in 2013 made the full text available for the first time, though many of Kripke's ideas had already been absorbed and discussed in the intervening decades, making the published version feel at once new and oddly dated—a testament to its influence .

One line of criticism comes from Meinongian philosophers who argue that Kripke's actualism cannot adequately explain the intentional directedness of fictional discourse. If Sherlock Holmes does not exist in any possible world, then pretending that Holmes was named and has certain properties seems indistinguishable in kind from pretending anything else—yet we distinguish between different fictional characters and their properties. The Meinongian alternative posits non-existent objects as the intended referents of fictional names, preserving the intuition that 'Sherlock Holmes' picks out something specific even if that something lacks existence . Kripke's account has also been criticized for leaving the semantics of negative existentials less than fully clear, though defenders argue that this is a problem for any view.

A common misreading assumes that Kripke's claim that fictional names do not refer means that statements about fiction are meaningless or that we cannot talk about fictional characters at all. Neither is correct. Kripke's point is that the reference in fiction is pretended, not that it is impossible or incoherent. We can meaningfully discuss what is true within a story, and we can make true negative existential claims about fictional characters. Another misreading treats the lectures as a mere appendix to Naming and Necessity, valuable only for its application of rigid designation to new cases. In fact, the lectures introduce methodological claims—particularly about the irrelevance of fiction as a test case—that are independent of the earlier framework and have implications for how philosophy of language should proceed.