The Possibility of Altruism

Nagel's central claim is that altruism is a basic rational requirement on action, not a contingent feeling of sympathy or a covert form of self-interest. The book defends a conception of ethics according to which altruism is included among the basic rational requirements on desire and action, just as there are rational requirements on thought . Nagel rejects both Hobbesian and Humean accounts of moral motivation: against Hobbes, he denies that moral action is ultimately motivated by self-preservation; against Hume, he denies that a moral-neutral sentiment or desire must be present for moral motivation to operate . His position resembles Kant's in holding that ethical motivation can be understood only through ethics itself, not through extra-moral psychology .

Nagel employs a transcendental argument. He takes as given the fact that reason has a practical use—that we do not merely reason theoretically to acquire true beliefs, but also apply our capacity to reason in deciding what to do. He then asks what must be the case for practical reasoning to be possible . The argument uncovers two consequences: first, practical reasoning can be characterized in terms of the form of good reasoning rather than case by case; second, altruism emerges as a formal requirement of practical reason. Alan Thomas describes this as Nagel's most powerful work and, in the opinion of many, his best book .

Nagel's argument links altruism to prudence through the idea of objective reasons. Just as prudence requires me to recognize my future self as having the same kind of claim on my present actions as my present self, altruism requires me to recognize other persons as having the same kind of claim as myself. The move from prudence to altruism depends on the impersonal standpoint: when I deliberate rationally, I must regard my own interests as having no special status simply because they are mine. The Routledge Encyclopedia notes that this first work gives a stronger role to the objective standpoint and its deliverances than Nagel's subsequent work in moral philosophy . The argument thus grounds altruism in the formal structure of practical reason rather than in benevolence.

Nicholas Sturgeon's critique is the most frequently cited challenge to Nagel's argument, and it served as one impulse for Nagel's later revision of his ethical position . Brian K. Powell has also argued that Nagel's argument for a requirement of altruism is unsuccessful and that any argument of its kind must fail . Nagel himself revised his position in The View from Nowhere (1986) and The Last Word (1997), accepting the possibility of subjective (agent-relative) reasons for which there is no corresponding objective (agent-neutral) counterpart . This revision marks a significant shift from the stronger objectivism of The Possibility of Altruism, though Nagel never abandoned the conviction that ethics is a branch of practical reason.

The book originated as a revision of Nagel's doctoral dissertation, supervised by John Rawls . It was published by Clarendon Press in Oxford in 1970 . Alan Thomas describes it as 'Nagel's most powerful work' and notes that it remains, in the opinion of many, his best book . The Routledge Encyclopedia identifies it as Nagel's first work and notes that it focuses on the motivational basis for morality, arguing that altruism is a basic rational requirement . Its influence has been substantial in moral philosophy, particularly among those working in the Kantian tradition, though its technical argument has attracted sustained criticism as well as defence. It remains the foundational statement of Nagel's ethical thought.

A frequent misconception is that Nagel denies any role to feeling in moral life or that he is a cold rationalist who thinks altruism requires the suppression of emotion. Nagel's claim is about the ground of moral motivation, not about the psychology of moral agents. He argues that the justification for altruistic action cannot be reduced to a contingent sentiment, because such sentiments are unreliable and not universally shared. But he does not deny that feelings of sympathy and concern often accompany moral action. The book's target is the philosophical thesis that moral motivation must be traced to a non-moral desire or sentiment, not the phenomenological claim that moral action is often felt. Nagel's Kantianism is about the autonomy of moral reasons, not about the elimination of emotion from moral psychology.